The long road to Tehran: the Iran nuclear deal in perspective by Gibson, Bryan
Bryan r. GiBson
sTraTEGiC UPDaTE 15.6
DECEMBER 2015
THE LONG ROAD TO TEHRAN
THE iran nUCLEar DEaL
in PErsPECTiVE
THE AUTHOR 
Bryan R. Gibson holds a PhD in International History 
from the London School of Economics, was a post-
doctoral research fellow at the LSE’s Centre for 
Diplomacy and Strategy, and an instructor on Middle 
Eastern politics in the LSE’s Department of International 
History and the University of East Anglia’s Department 
of Political, Social and International Studies (PSI).
He has taught undergraduate courses on U.S. and 
British politics toward the Gulf region, the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, and Arab nationalism, winning a departmental 
teaching excellence award in 2011. He also taught 
undergraduate and postgraduate courses on Middle 
Eastern politics at the University of East Anglia.
He is the author of Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, 
the Kurds, and the Cold War (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015), Covert Relationship: U.S. Foreign Policy, 
Intelligence and the Iran-Iraq War (Praeger, 2010), 
and co-edited with Professor Nigel Ashton, The Iran-
Iraq War: New International Perspectives (Routledge, 
2012). He also contributes regularly to publications 
dealing with Middle Eastern issues, like Foreign 
Policy, Middle East Eye, CNN, and Huffington Post.
His research focuses on foreign policy decision-
making with respect to the Middle East and Gulf 
regions. Specifically, he analyses U.S. foreign 
policy toward Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf.
Gibson 1 
THE LONG ROAD TO TEHRAN 
THE iran nUCLEar DEaL 
in PErsPECTiVE
The history of the Iranian nuclear issue is littered with missed 
opportunities. It is a history in which fixation on the perfect 
crowded out the good, and in whose rearview mirror we can see 
deals that look a lot better now than they seemed then. With all 
its inevitable imperfections, we can’t afford to miss this one.
— William J. Burns, Deputy Secretary of State, 2011-2014 
After nearly 20 months of near-continuous negotiations, on 14 July 2015  Iran and the 
P5+1—the five permanent members of the Security Council (US, UK, France, Russia and 
China) and Germany—reached a deal designed to limit Iran’s nuclear enrichment capability 
and prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons capability in exchange for relief from the 
sanctions that have been crippling its economy over the course of the past decade. 
A lot is at stake in this deal for all parties. For Iran the deal marks a potential return to the 
international community, a chance to salvage its faltering economy and a new opportunity 
to help resolve a wide range of crises in the Middle East, particularly the challenge posed 
by the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS). 
For the United States the deal signals a major diplomatic breakthrough for the Obama 
administration, especially if it could prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and 
even potentially work with the Islamic Republic to increase regional security. 
The welcoming of Iran back into the international community also raises economic 
opportunities to repair the damage done by years of sanctions and mismanagement. 
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For the Gulf States the deal could reduce the risk from a potential adversary, alongside 
assurances of American military protection. 
The deal also shows great promise for staving off a potential nuclear arms race between 
Iran and its regional, ideological,and sectarian rival Saudi Arabia. For decades these two 
nations have rivalled each other for regional dominance; to remove Iran’s nuclear threat 
would significantly reduce the likelihood that this rivalry could go nuclear. 
Finally Israel, despite the hyperbolic rhetoric of its current government, likely stands to benefit 
the most from the deal. The checks and balances imposed on Iran’s nuclear programme would 
give Israel  breathing room for over a decade, with the United States certain to provide an 
increase in military assistance to counterbalance any military threat Iran may pose. 
For all actors the deal stands out as an opportunity to resolve, or at least scale back, ethno-
sectarian tensions that have plagued the Middle East since Iran’s revolution in 1978-79. 
To understand the implications of a nuclear deal with Iran, it is necessary to place the 
agreement within the historical context of US-Iran relations and recognise that major 
diplomatic breakthroughs like this do not happen in a vacuum: they are the product of 
years of hard, tedious work. 
This Strategic Update provides a detailed examination of the policies of the George W. Bush 
and Barack Obama administrations, showing both how the Iran deal came about and the 
acrimonious and divisive nature of the agreement. 
The 2013 election of Hassan Rouhani, a moderate who appeared determined to secure relief 
from the crippling economic sanctions imposed upon Iran in return for scaling back its nuclear 
programme, and the rise of the Islamic State created a favourable set of circumstances where 
both the United States and Iran stood to gain more from a nuclear deal than they had to lose. 
Fortunately for Rouhani and the Obama administration, which had failed in its initial attempts 
to reach out to Iran in 2009, also recognised and seized upon this opportunity to resolve one 
of the most persistent and frustrating diplomatic stalemates in modern history. 
This would be no easy task as the current Israeli leadership and their allies in the US Congress 
tried to block all efforts to make concessions, no matter how reasonable they might be, to 
Iran. This created a crisis unprecedented in American diplomatic history, where a foreign 
state was aligned with a legislative body against a sitting president and the international 
community. The political battle over the Iran deal is certain to be remembered as one of the 
greatest in modern international history. 
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A BRiEf HisTORy Of Us-iRAN RELATiONs: 1953-2000
Prior to the 1970s, American diplomats viewed the Persian Gulf as a ‘British Lake’, a 
euphemism for a British sphere of influence.2 The first major crisis in US-Iran relations 
occurred in 1953, when the CIA helped overthrow the democratically elected government 
of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq and empowered the regime of Shah Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi. 
The consequences of this fateful American action would reverberate for decades. Iran’s 
revolution was not just against the Shah and his corrupt regime; it was a reaction against 
the United States, its foreign policy, its culture and its values. Having survived the CIA-
trained torturers in the Shah’s dungeons, the new Iranian leadership labelled the US the 
‘Great Satan’ and built up an entire revolutionary Islamic ideology upon a foundation of 
anti-Americanism.3 
The deterioration of US-Iran relations after the revolution culminated in the seizing of the 
US Embassy grounds in Tehran on 4 November 1979 and the holding of 52 American 
diplomats hostage for the next 444 days.4 This brazen breach of diplomatic protocol 
single-handedly crippled the presidency of Jimmy Carter and contributed to his electoral 
defeat in 1980.5 This was truly one of America’s lowest moments. 
Nonetheless in the 35 years since the revolution every US administration, from Reagan 
to Obama, has tried to improve relations with Iran.6 Until recently, none of these efforts 
has been successful and there are plenty of reasons for both sides to feel betrayed and 
distrustful.7 
Each American president has approached Iran differently. Ronald Reagan engaged in an 
ill-fated scheme to trade US-made arms for American hostages taken by Iranian allies in 
Lebanon, leading to the so-called Iran-Contra scandal.8 George H.W. Bush reached out to 
Iran to help secure the release of the remaining hostages, declaring that ‘goodwill begets 
goodwill’. However, as Bush’s national security advisor Brent Scowcroft later recalled 
‘When the hostages were released, we didn’t do anything’.9 The Iranians understandably 
felt betrayed. 
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A GLimmER Of HOpE
In the 1990s, the Clinton administration escalated tensions with Iran when it announced a 
policy known as ‘dual containment’. The policy was designed to isolate both Iran and Iraq 
regionally, cut them off from the world economic and trading system, and encourage regime 
change in Iraq.10 The problem, according to Gregory Gause, was that dual containment 
was ‘shot through with logical flaws and practical inconsistencies [and] based on faulty 
geopolitical premises’. He pointed out that the Iranians at this point in time were actively 
demobilizing their military following the devastating eight-year-long Iran-Iraq War and were 
focused inwardly on reconstruction.11 
Iran seemed to act as if there were two different faces of the same regime. Perhaps the best 
example is Mohammad Khatami, who shocked political analysts when he won a landslide 
election in 1997. Campaigning on a platform of reform and engagement with the West, 
Khatami won nearly 70 percent of the vote. No one in the US government, not even the 
CIA, saw the result coming.12 
Khatami did not appear to be bluffing. Upon coming to office, he travelled to the United 
States for the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA). While there, he gave an interview with 
CNN where he said ‘all doors should now be open for such dialogue and understanding 
and the possibility for contact between Iranian and American citizens’.13 Intrigued by the 
sudden change in tone coming out of Tehran, President Clinton seized this opportunity and 
exchanged letters with the Iranian leadership in 1999. Unfortunately, regime hardliners close 
to the new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, undercut Khatami and rejected the 
American overture in a polite but curt letter.14 
‘WE DON’T spEAk TO EviL’
When George W. Bush came to office in January 2001 his administration was deeply divided 
on how to approach Iran. One faction wanted to continue Clinton’s policy of engaging 
the Khatami government, while another sought regime change.15 Initially those seeking 
engagement held the upper hand. 
To American policymakers, the outpouring of grief inside Iran after 9/11 and its covert 
support for the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 indicated that powerful 
players within the Iranian leadership were interested in working with the US. Consequently, 
as Barbara Slavin reports, this led to more than a dozen meetings between a handful of 
American and Iranian diplomats between September 2001 and May 2003.16
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At the same time, the 9/11 terror attacks altered America’s threat perception by revealing 
that major threats did not just originate from enemy states but from small transnational 
terror groups. In particular, US policymakers feared that states like Iraq, Iran, Syria or Libya 
could provide terror groups with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which could then 
be used against America. 
From this point onward, the Bush administration adopted a zero-sum attitude toward state 
sponsorship of terrorism. As America launched the ‘War on Terror’, it sought to secure 
support throughout the Middle East as it prepared to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, two 
of Iran’s neighbours. 
Because of Iran’s historical support for radical Islamist groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon 
and Hamas in Palestine, those in Washington pressing for regime change in Tehran had 
now gained the upper hand. This was particularly evident when President Bush included 
Iran as part of an ‘Axis of Evil’ in his 2002 State of the Union Address, even though Iran 
continued to assist the CIA in Afghanistan.17
America’s quiet working relationship with Iran even survived the controversy surrounding 
an Iranian militant group, called the Mujahedeen e-Khalq (MEK), and its exposure in August 
2002 of Iran’s secret nuclear programme, including a vast uranium enrichment plant at 
Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak.18 According to Axworthy, some believe that the 
Israeli Mossad had used the MEK as a front for the release of this information. This, it has 
been suggested, would establish the MEK’s bona fides as an operator and garner support 
from the US, which was precisely what happened.19 
The US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 terrified the Iranian government. As Parsi points 
out, ‘the swiftness with which the United States defeated the strongest standing Arab 
army—which the Iranians had failed to defeat after eight bloody years of warfare—sent 
shivers down the spines of America’s foes in the region and beyond’.20 
As a result, in May 2003, Iran asked the Swiss ambassador to Iran, Tim Guldimann, to deliver 
a proposal that had been approved at the highest levels of the Iranian regime, including the 
Supreme Leader. The proposal was hand-delivered to President Bush through Representative 
Bob Ney (R-Ohio), who spoke Persian and had lived in Iran prior to the revolution.21 The 
proposal put everything on the table: Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas, for Israeli-
Palestinian peace negotiations, and its nuclear programme.22 
American policymakers were divided over how to respond to the Iranian proposal. On  one 
side, Secretary of State Colin Powell, his deputy Richard Armitage and National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice saw this as a major breakthrough and encouraged a positive 
response. However, Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
cut them off, saying ‘we don’t’ speak to evil’.23 
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It was clear that the Bush administration, buoyed by its apparent success in Iraq, was not 
interested in supporting the talks. In fact Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s national security 
advisor at the time, later claimed that she could not recall ever seeing the Iranian proposal. 
Both sides cancelled a meeting scheduled for 25 May.24
Despite the collapse of the US-Iranian talks, the discovery of Iran’s nuclear programme 
kicked diplomacy into high gear. Between 2003 and 2005, America’s European allies, Britain, 
France and Germany, pursued a ‘critical dialogue’ with Iran over its nuclear programme.25 
In October 2003, both sides reach an agreement to suspend Iran’s enrichment of uranium, 
have Iran sign the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and allow 
intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).26 An American 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) from 2007 confirmed that Iran abandoned its nuclear 
weapons programme at this time, a conclusion that went against the Bush administration’s 
preferences.27
Despite the 2003 agreement, over the course of the next two years the US and the European 
Union (EU) continued to raise concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme. In November 2004, 
Iran was accused of violating the agreement and after a 22-hour negotiation agreed to once 
again suspend enrichment.28 Then, in July 2005, the US provided the IAEA with documents 
from a stolen Iranian laptop, allegedly containing designs for a nuclear weapon.29 
However, Gareth Porter, an investigative journalist, has dismissed the laptop debacle as 
‘fabrications’ created by Israeli intelligence and the MEK in order to increase international 
support for sanctions against Iran.30 Regardless of whether the laptop was genuine or not, the 
revelation of these documents had a tremendous impact on the growing Iran nuclear crisis.
sANcTiONs AND THE RETURN Of REvOLUTiONARy iRAN
The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June 2005 brought about a major shift in Iran’s 
foreign policy. With the United States bogged down in Iraq, Iran’s geostrategic position in the 
region had improved considerably. As a result, Ahmadinejad adopted a belligerent attitude 
and instead of scaling back Iran’s nuclear programme, he championed it as an ‘inalienable 
right’—language drawn from the NPT. At the same time, he also picked a direct fight with 
Israel, making headlines by denying the Holocaust and allegedly calling for Israel to be 
‘wiped off the map’.31 In a sense, Ahmadinejad’s bellicose rhetoric played right in Israel’s 
hands, giving credence to its longstanding concern that Iran’s nuclear programme was an 
‘existential threat’ to its existence. 
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In the autumn of 2005, the IAEA issued a report declaring that Iran had not been in 
compliance with NPT safeguards. In particular, it claimed that Iran had resumed uranium 
enrichment at Natantz and Arak.32 This led to a third wave of sanctions against Iran, only 
this time under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). As the Iran 
Project pointed out, the Security Council resolutions—UNSCR 1737, 1747, and 1803—were 
designed to persuade Iran to suspend indefinitely its enrichment of uranium; to sign the 
‘Additional Protocol’ of the NPT; to permit expanded inspection of its nuclear facilities; and 
to reach a negotiated agreement with the EU over the future of its nuclear programme.33 
cOvERT AcTiON
Despite growing sanctions and Iran’s now defiant approach to the nuclear question, toward 
the end of Bush’s second term the US and Israel began to look for alternative approaches 
- including targeted killings and cyber-warfare. 
David Crist, in his book The Twilight Wars, writes about a meeting between American and 
Israeli officials toward the end of the Bush administration to discuss their options on Iran. 
‘Israeli officials proposed extreme measures such as assassinations of Iranian scientists and 
supporting armed opposition groups inside Iran,’ like the MEK, but the US ‘completely 
rejected these schemes’.34 However, just because the Americans rejected these proposals 
did not mean that the Israelis had. 
To counter Iran’s nuclear ambitions Israel assassinated at least five Iranians associated 
with the controversial programme between 2007 and 2012.35 In addition, the head of the 
country’s ballistic missile programme and the commander of Iran’s Cyber War Headquarters 
were also killed.36 The extent to which America was involved in these targeted killings is 
unknown, whereas Israel’s involvement is an open secret. As one senior US official joked 
in 2011: the US always denies everything; the Israelis, however, ‘also deny everything—but 
with a smile’.37 
Either way, the assassination campaign was clearly designed to send psychological and 
physical threats to those working on Iran’s nuclear programme: quit and survive or continue 
to work and die. Today, as the US seeks to engage Iran and scale back its nuclear programme, 
the Obama administration has been forced to ask Israel to back off from the assassination 
campaign. The Israelis apparently agreed, citing the danger of these operations, at least 
for the time being.38
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OLympic GAmEs
A second—and perhaps more effective—approach to dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme 
was the use of cyber warfare to sabotage its reactors. Working closely with the Israelis, the 
US initiated a highly classified covert cyber warfare operation in 2006 known as Olympic 
Games. From its outset, there was widespread support for this option. Before leaving office 
President Bush green-lit the $300 million operation39 and President Obama accelerated it 
after coming to office.40
Olympic Games involved at least two highly sophisticated computer viruses, Stuxnet and 
Flame—and possibly others that have not yet been exposed. These cyber-attacks on Iran’s 
nuclear infrastructure were significant not just because they were discovered but because 
of the damage they inflicted. 
Of the two, Stuxnet is more famous. Discovered in the summer of 2010, Stuxnet was designed 
to infiltrate and seize control of the computer systems controlling Iran’s nuclear reactors and 
then rapidly speed up or slow down the centrifuges, causing them to break, while at the 
same time sending false signals to the computers monitoring the process. 
Just as the virus was achieving some success—having destroyed approximately 20 percent of 
Iran’s 5,000 working centrifuges—it was discovered infecting computer systems outside Iran. 
This sparked speculation over the origin of the virus and led to the scheme being uncovered.41 
Ivanka Barzashka argues ‘the overall effect of the malware on Tehran’s enrichment efforts 
in the medium-to-long term was limited at best’ and the ‘misrepresentation of Stuxnet’s 
effects may have hindered diplomatic solutions at a time when they could have had real 
threat-reduction and confidence-building benefits’.42
The second virus, Flame, was in fact far more sophisticated than Stuxnet. Whereas Stuxnet 
was created to specifically target Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Flame was designed for purely 
espionage purposes; to act as a vacuum cleaner and sweep up information from Iranian 
computers and then transmit the data, likely to the NSA.43 Discovered in 2012, news reports 
indicate that the virus had been in existence for at least five years.44
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AN ExTENDED HAND
When President Barack Obama came to office in 2009, he adopted a much different 
approach to Iran than his predecessors. Just two days after the election, Ahmadinejad 
shocked US officials when he sent president-elect Obama a congratulatory letter, saying, 
‘Iran welcomes major, just and real chances in [America’s] policies and behaviour’. 
Obama seized this opportunity and responded not to Ahmadinejad but to Ali Khamenei, 
the real power broker in Tehran, proposing talks without preconditions on Iran’s nuclear 
programme and other regional issues, like the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. When Khamenei 
responded, he politely highlighted Iran’s grievances with America, but he did not commit 
to talks.45 Obama would not let up. On 20 March 2009, Obama held out an olive branch to 
the Iranian people on their New Year, Nawruz. Obama would win the Nobel Prize—perhaps 
prematurely—for this effort to overcome the differences between the two adversaries.
According to leaked documents made available through Wikileaks, Obama’s effort paid off. 
A cable sent from the US Embassy in Oman in April 2009 reveals that the Iranians had told 
the Omanis that they were ‘ready to begin a quiet dialog ‘at a lower level’ with the US’.46 
On 4 June, just weeks before the controversial Iranian presidential election, Obama gave 
another speech at Cairo University, where he pledged a ‘new beginning’ for America’s 
relations with the Islamic world. After acknowledging America’s troubled past relations 
with Iran, including America’s role in the 1953 coup, Obama said, ‘rather than remain 
trapped in the past, I have made it clear to Iran’s leaders and people that my country is 
prepared to move forward’.47 On the eve of the Green Revolution, President Obama was 
presenting the Iranian people with an opportunity to return to the international community. 
Alas, the disputed results of Iran’s election, held on 12 June 2009, were a major turning 
point in Obama’s effort to improve relations. As hundreds of thousands of Iranians flocked 
to the street to protest the contentious election results, which secured a second term for 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the regime responded with violence and intimidation, prompting 
international outrage. It was clear that elements of the Iranian regime were responding 
to Obama’s open hand with a clenched fist. 
Again, there appeared to be two Iranian faces: a moderate one represented by the Foreign 
Ministry that appeared to be open to talks, and a conservative one represented by the 
Revolutionary Guard whose ideology is dependent on having America as an enemy.
Fortunately, Obama was cognisant of this reality and adopted a strategy aimed at bolstering 
the former, while undermining the latter through targeted sanctions. 
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EcONOmic sTRANGULATiON
In the aftermath of the Iranian election, the Obama administration elected to adopt a strategy 
designed to strangle Iran’s economy and force it to the negotiating table in a weakened 
position. 
To achieve this the United States needed to adopt a multilateral approach, which would 
entail engaging the international community and rallying the UN Security Council to pass the 
most comprehensive sanctions ever imposed on a nation. Part of the reason for the Obama 
administration’s eventual success was the exposure of Iran’s secret Fordow nuclear enrichment 
facility in September 2009, a development that concerned all the permanent members of the 
Security Council. The Obama administration finally had the leverage it needed to convince 
the Security Council of Iran’s ongoing deception about its nuclear programme and impose 
a comprehensive set of sanctions designed to cut Iran off from the global economy.48
This did not, however, mean that an American opening to Iran was completely off the table. 
According to Laura Rozen, a well-connected journalist for Al-Monitor, in October 2009 Deputy 
Under Secretary of State William Burns and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jallili met 
one-on-one on the sidelines of P5+1 nuclear talks in Geneva, where a nuclear fuel swap 
deal was announced. Essentially, the US wanted Iran to relinquish its stockpile of enriched 
uranium in exchange for Russian-made fuel for its nuclear research reactor. Unfortunately, 
Iran backed away from the agreement when the deal came under intense domestic criticism.49 
Despite this hiccup, within two months Oman had again approached the US to offer its 
services to establish a ‘discreet’ channel to Iran.50 In time, this channel would prove useful. 
Despite chaos in the streets of Tehran, the imposition of international sanctions, targeted 
killings, sophisticated cyber attacks, and secret backchannel talks, Iran’s nuclear programme 
still continued to expand.51 This prompted the Obama administration to turn back to the 
Security Council to seek a new round of sanctions. In response, Iran tried to decrease tensions 
by finally agreeing to a Brazilian and Turkish initiative that was similar to Burns’ fuel-swap 
proposal from October 2009. 
The problem for the US was that Iran had expanded its nuclear programme since the original 
offer, but then refused to negotiate. As a result, the US government rejected the plan and 
pressed ahead with a new round of sanctions from the Security Council, leading to the 
passage of UNSCR 1929 in June 2010. This resolution banned companies from working with 
Iran’s energy industry, providing shipping insurance or trade credits, or conducting financial 
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transactions with Iranian banks.52 As the Iran Project pointed out:
Congress took UNSC resolution 1929 a step further by enacting 
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment 
Act (CISADA), which aimed at preventing foreign firms from 
selling gasoline to Iran and blacklisted several Iranian banks.53
Still, this was not enough for the Americans: 
Additional sanctions were put in place by Executive Order and by the 
US Congress, in light of the Iranian regime’s repression of the Green 
Movement protesting the [June 2009] elections … and the worsening 
conditions in Syria (where Iran is assisting the Assad government).54 
These sanctions, in effect, cut Iran off from the international banking system and isolated 
it further from the international community. This is a clear example of both the White 
House and Congress working together to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. 
THE cAsE Of THE UsED cAR sALEsmAN AssAssiN
In October 2010 the United States Attorney General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
announced that they were charging an Iranian-born used car salesman from Texas, Mansour 
Arbabsiar, with conspiring with members of Iran’s elite Quds Force to hire assassins from 
a Mexican drug cartel for $1.5 million to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States, 
Adel al-Jubeir. 
Arbabsiar had been arrested at the end of September.55 The US government responded to 
the plot aggressively, with several senators describing the conspiracy as ‘an act of war’.56 
Meanwhile, the Obama administration imposed a new round of sanctions against the Iranians 
tied to the conspiracy, including the head of the Quds Force General Qasem Soleimani.57
The Arbabsiar case is peculiar for several reasons. First, as Scott Peterson points out, ‘the 
Qods Force has a reputation for careful, methodical work—as well as effective use of local 
proxies, and ultimately their pragmatic deployment by Tehran as covert tools to expand 
Iran’s influence across a region in flux’.58 
Second, the operation was very clumsy, relying on a mentally unstable amateur for an 
operation that could have major international consequences. As Gary Sick argues, it also 
seemed strange that the Quds Force would turn to ‘a Mexican criminal drug gang that is 
known to be riddled with both Mexican and US intelligence agents’, especially if it wanted 
to maintain plausible deniability. 
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Fourth, an Iranian-backed assassination attempt on US soil was a significant departure from 
Iran’s operating procedures, with Sick noting, ‘Iran has never conducted—or apparently 
even attempted—an assassination or a bombing inside the US’.59 
Finally, according to Alireza Nader, an expert on the IRGC, ‘this [plot] doesn’t seem to 
serve Iran’s interests in any conceivable way. Assassinating the Saudi ambassador would 
increase international pressure against Iran, could be considered an act of war ... by saudi 
Arabia, it could really destabilize the government in Iran; and this is a political system that 
is interested in its own survival’.60 
Despite expert opinion, and questions being raised about his mental capacity, Arbabsiar 
plead guilty and was sentence to 25 years in prison for his involvement in the plot.61 
THE isRAELi cARD
Israel has long played a central role in the drama over Iran’s nuclear programme. If ever the 
US government held out a carrot to Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was 
never too far away with a stick. Nevertheless, early in the Obama administration Netanyahu 
pressed the White House to reconsider using military force against Iran. 
For years, the US had made it publicly known that ‘all options’—including the use of military 
force—were ‘on the table’ to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability. 
While both the Obama and Bush administrations had stressed this point, they both agreed 
on the need to restrain Israel from attacking Iran, believing such an action could spark a 
region-wide Middle Eastern war, and that diplomacy was the best option.62 
In 2008, for example, President Bush rejected an Israeli request to obtain specialised 
bunker-busting bombs that could be used to attack the Fordow nuclear complex buried 
deep beneath a mountain. Worried that an Israeli attack could inflame the region, Bush 
instead gave the go-ahead for Olympic Games as a means of placating Israel’s concerns 
and convincing it to hold off an attack.63 
As the election cycle kicked into high gear in 2011 and 2012, the media was awash with 
reports of an impending Israel strike on Iran’s nuclear programme. As Crist observed, ‘every 
year this story reared its head’. But the prospect of going to war with Iran over an Israeli 
attack worried senior US policymakers. To them, the Israelis did not seem to consider the 
repercussions of such an action, including a major regional war that could involve ground 
forces not to mention retaliatory terrorist strikes.64 As the US was winding down two major 
wars in the Middle East, the last thing the Obama administration wanted was a new one 
with Iran. 
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The Obama administration continued to believe that increasingly ‘smart’ sanctions were 
the key. In 2012, the US passed a new round of sanctions targeting Iran’s central bank 
and the means by which it received its oil payments. The EU followed suit, imposing its 
own sanctions and also announcing that it would phase out Iranian oil purchases.65 At the 
same time the Obama administration lobbied the primary consumers of Iranian oil, Japan 
(17 percent) and South Korea (9 percent), to reduce their imports. However India, which 
made up for 16 percent of Iran’s exports, refused.66 
Alarmed at the staggering loss of income, Iran responded by threatening to close the 
Strait of Hormuz, through which one-sixth of the world’s oil supply passes. As I argued in 
a 2012 piece for The Majalla, this was an empty threat:
[If] Iran was to close the strait it would deprive itself of the ability to export 
oil. Without the sale of oil, the Iran cannot finance itself and its economy 
could collapse. In short, closing the Strait of Hormuz would hurt Iran far 
more than any sanctions the Obama administration could ever dream up.67
As tensions mounted between the US and Iran, Netanyahu sought to capitalise on this 
and press again for military action. During a meeting in March 2012, Obama would not 
budge. Frustrated, Netanyahu warned that once Iran entered the ‘zone of immunity,’ the 
point where military action will not be able to halt Iran’s nuclear programme, it would be 
too late and an Iranian nuclear bomb would be a forgone conclusion. To Netanyahu, Israel 
simply could not allow this to happen.68
At the 2012 United Nations General Assembly, Netanyahu warned the international 
community once again about Iran’s nuclear programme. Taking out a cartoon image of a 
bomb and drawing a red line, he explained: 
by next spring, at most by next summer, at current enrichment rates, 
[Iran] will have finished the medium enrichment and move on to the 
final stage. From there, it’s only a few months, possibly a few weeks, 
before they get enough enriched uranium for the first bomb.69 
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fROm sEcRET TALks TO A BREAkTHROUGH
In the autumn of 2012, the sanctions on Iran began to show tangible results. By October the 
value of Iran’s currency, the rial, had dropped by nearly 40 percent, plunging the country into 
an economic crisis. Protestors took to the streets to demand the government do something 
about the extremely high levels of inflation.70 The sanctions were biting.
Iran’s growing desperation for sanctions relief, coupled with President Obama securing a 
second term and Israeli threats of military action, helped set the stage for a secret opening 
between the two countries in early 2013. For years, the Omani government had offered its 
services as a potential back channel to Iran. According to Rozen, in 2011 senior US officials 
‘participated in at least two lower-level, ‘preparatory’ meetings with the Iranians, facilitated 
by the Omanis, to see about the prospect of a bilateral channel to be led on the US side by 
Burns’. A second meeting was held in Oman on 7 July 2012.71 
In early March 2013, American and Iranian officials met again in Oman and spent three days 
discussing Iran’s nuclear programme. These talks were tentative, with both sides uncertain 
about the other’s intention. As one former US official who was familiar with the talks 
observed, ‘it was a useful engagement, but not much progress was made, because the Iran 
leadership was not really interested’. However, the talks were important because it helped 
provide a basis for a future understanding, which would rest largely on the outcome of 
the Iranian elections in June 2013. Until then, the former official said, ‘real progress wasn’t 
going to be possible’.72 
With an Iranian election set for June, during the spring of 2013 the US and Israel amplified 
their pressure on Iran. In April, Netanyahu told the BBC that only way to stop Iran and its 
nuclear programme was a ‘direct military threat,’ and not sanctions or tough diplomacy.73 His 
statements occurred right around the time that a $29.5 billion US arms deal that provided 
missiles, warplanes, and troop transport carriers to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) became public. According to one senior US official, the deal sought to 
boost the military capabilities of America’s regional allies so that they could better address 
the Iranian threat and also to allow for a greater network of coordinated assets around the 
region to handle a range of contingencies.74 
The results of Iran’s 2013 election came as a welcome surprise. Much like in 1997, when 
Mohammad Khatami swept the field, Hassan Rouhani, a former nuclear negotiator and 
reformist candidate who managed to make it through Iran’s tough vetting process for 
presidential candidates, soundly defeated his pro-regime opponents. Running on a platform 
of ‘prudence and hope,’ Rouhani’s pledge to engage the West diplomatically and secure 
sanctions relief resonated with Iran’s population, who were suffering terribly as the economy 
deteriorated.75
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Within weeks of Rouhani’s inauguration the United States and Iran had reactivated the 
Omani channel. In August 2013 Burns led a team of Americans to Oman to discuss a 
prospective nuclear deal.76 On 17 September, Rouhani sent a letter to the Washington 
Post that laid out his views on foreign policy and the need for diplomatic engagement in 
a post-Cold War world. He wrote:
In a world where global politics is no longer a zero-sum game, it 
is—or should be—counterintuitive to pursue one’s interests without 
considering the interests of others. A constructive approach to 
diplomacy doesn’t mean relinquishing one’s rights. It means engaging 
with one’s counterparts, on the basis of equal footing and mutual 
respect, to address shared concerns and achieve shared objectives. 
In other words, win-win outcomes are not just favourable but also 
achievable. A zero-sum, Cold War mentality leads to everyone’s loss.77
In the lead-up to the UNGA Rouhani continued to stun Western observers: condemning 
Syria’s use of chemical weapons; wishing Jews a happy Rosh Hashanah; exchanging private 
letters with Obama; and releasing prominent political prisoners.78 These positive gestures 
led to further meetings between American and Iranian officials, culminating in a meeting 
between Secretary of State John Kerry and Iran’s foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif 
on 26 September,79 and Obama’s now-famous telephone call to Rouhani the next day, the 
first direct contact between the leaders of the two countries since 1979.80  
Israel’s reaction to the Obama-Rouhani telephone call was guarded. According to news 
reports, Netanyahu ‘directed his ministers not to comment on the Obama-Rouhani phone 
call or US-Iranian relations’ prior to his meeting with Obama a few days later.81 
The meeting was bound to be tense, with Netanyahu telling reporters prior to travelling 
to Washington, ‘I will speak the truth. Facts must be stated in the face of the sweet talk 
and the blitz of smiles’.82 Netanyahu stressed that sanctions on Iran should not be relieved 
until it stops uranium enrichment, removes it from the country, closes down the plant at 
Qom and abandons a plutonium channel to a nuclear bomb. Obama agreed, saying, ‘we 
enter talks [with Iran] clear eyed. We take no option off the table including military option 
to make sure [it] doesn’t get nuclear weapons’.83
 As soon as talks between the P5+1 and Iran began in earnest on 16 October in Geneva, 
Switzerland it was apparent that change was in the air. US officials were pleased with the 
first day of ‘substantive’ and ‘forward looking’ talks. A senior US official summed up the 
mood perfectly: ‘I’ve been doing this now for about two years, and I have never had such 
intense, detailed, straightforward, candid conversations with the Iranian delegation before’.84 
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One immediate outcome of the talks was that Iran agreed in mid-November to resolve all 
outstanding issues it has had with the IAEA, including allowing inspectors back into its 
nuclear facilities.85 This major step in the nuclear negotiations ultimately set the stage for 
the announcement of an interim nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Plan of Action 
(JPOA), on 24 November 2013.86 
The terms of the deal were fairly straightforward. Iran agreed to cease enriching uranium, 
reduce its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium, construct no facilities capable of 
enrichment, and allow more intrusive IAEA inspections. In return, the P5+1 agreed to pause 
efforts to reduce Iran’s oil sales and suspend select US and EU sanctions, on Iran’s petrochemical 
exports, its access to precious metals, and those targeting its auto and aviation industries. 
The US would implement no new sanctions and make available funds eld abroad for the 
purchase of humanitarian goods, like food or medicine.87
THE DEBATE
The debate surrounding the Obama administration’s approach to Iran has been incredibly 
divisive, especially in the period following the initial breakthrough in November 2013. On 
one side are Israel and its allies in the US Congress; particularly then House Speaker John 
Boehner (R-Ohio), Senators Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) and Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), on the Republican 
side, and Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Chuck Schumer (D-NY) on the Democratic. 
Nevertheless, the most vocal opponent to any sort of diplomatic engagement with Iran has 
been Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his allies in Washington’s pro-Israel 
groups, chief among them the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and Jewish 
Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). This constellation includes several hawkish 
organisations as well, such as the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, and the Institute for Science and International Security.88 
The position of these groups is unequivocal: they see any deal with Iran that leaves any of 
its nuclear infrastructure intact as a capitulation akin to Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement 
of Adolf Hitler over the question of Czechoslovakia in 1938. They worked to sabotage any 
nuclear agreement with Iran, whom they argue is determined to wipe Israel off the map. 
When the interim deal was announced on 24 November 2013, for instance, Netanyahu 
described it as a ‘historic mistake,’ saying, the ‘world became a much more dangerous place 
because the most dangerous regime in the world [Iran] made a significant step in obtaining 
the most dangerous weapons in the world’.89 
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The Republicans, and their pro-Israel allies, developed a multi-pronged strategy that consisted 
of a) pushing for new sanctions legislation aimed at scuttling the talks; and b) calling like-
minded experts before the House and Senate foreign affairs committees in order to shift 
the debate away from the Obama administration’s narrative. 
Netanyahu’s allies in Congress began an immediate push to impose a new round of sanctions 
against Iran,90 even though this would violate the spirit and the terms of the agreement. 
This led President Obama to threaten to veto any bill that would jeopardise the ongoing 
nuclear talks,91 which forced the pro-Israel lobby to back down, at least temporarily.92 From 
2013, Congress held 26 hearings on the Iran talks; of the 82 experts who have testified 
before the senate or house committees, 56 were from witnesses that were highly critical 
of the deal or the negotiations.93 
On the other side are those who favour a deal with Iran that puts in place a framework 
of checks and balances on its nuclear enrichment programme to prevent it from acquiring 
a nuclear weapon. The essential premise of this position, to paraphrase Ronald Reagan’s 
observation about his nuclear deal with the Soviets, was ‘trust, but verify,’ though in this 
case the maxim would be modified to be ‘Don’t trust, but verify.’ 
The pro-deal group is quite diverse. It includes the bipartisan Iran Project, which was set up 
by former ambassador Tom Pickering and includes the support of dozens of high ranking 
US foreign policymakers, including two former National Security Advisors, Brent Scowcroft 
and Zbigniew Bzrezinski.94 The pro-deal group also includes Trita Parsi’s National Iranian 
American Council (NIAC), which operates as a pro-diplomatic engagement Iran lobby in 
Washington while maintaining considerable distance in its stance from Tehran. 
The most vocal proponents of a nuclear deal, of course, have been President Obama and 
Secretary Kerry, who have argued that it represents the best means of preventing Iran 
from obtaining a nuclear weapon and the only other alternative is war. The departments 
of Defense, State, Treasury and Energy have supported engagement with Iran as well, and 
defended the administration’s position in regular, and often hostile, congressional hearings. 
In particular, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz has been crucial to the administration’s case, 
as he played an integral role in ironing out the technical details of an agreement. Moniz is 
well qualified for the job. Since the early 1970s Moniz has been a leading nuclear physicist 
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), while periodically taking on positions in US 
administrations, and wields a depth of expertise on nuclear technology, especially fissile-
material production. 
18      LSE IDEAS Strategic Update 15.6
Within Congress, support for the Obama administration’s position is somewhat limited, 
but not altogether absent. For the past several years, Senators Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), 
Diane Feinstein (D-Calif.), Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), and Keith Ellison (D-Minn.) have been 
supportive of the administration’s effort to improve relations with Iran so long as it secures 
an agreement that would limit its ability to acquire a nuclear weapon. 
fROm BREAkTHROUGH TO GRiDLOck
In the six months since the terms of the interim deal came into effect on 20 January 2014, 
Iran continued to meet its obligations.95 In mid-April, the IAEA confirmed that Iran had diluted 
75 percent of its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium, prompting the US to release 
$450 million in seized funds.96 By July, Iran had complied with its obligations to neutralise 
fully its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium, capped its stockpile of 5 percent enriched 
uranium, frozen the installation of advanced centrifuges as well as not the installation or 
testing of new components at its Arak reactor,and accepted frequent inspections of its 
nuclear facilities.97 
Thanks to the JPOA, observed the State Department’s chief nuclear negotiator Wendy 
Sherman, Iran’s nuclear programme is ‘more constrained, more transparent, and better 
understood than it was a year ago’.98 On 18 July, the P5+1 and Iran announced that talks 
would be extended for six months in order to finalise the terms of an agreement. As a 
reward, the US released another $2.8 billion of restricted Iranian assets.99 
In the six months after the talks were extended, the geopolitical situation in the region 
underwent a profound geopolitical transformation. In June 2014, a relatively obscure Sunni 
militant group, calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the 
Islamic State, seized control of large swathes of Iraqi and Syrian territory, including Iraq’s 
third largest city, Mosul. The Islamic State quickly posed a clear and present danger to the 
Shi’a-dominated, Iranian-aligned Iraqi regime of Nuri al-Maliki.100 
After ISIS militants trapped thousands of Yezidis on a mountaintop and came within striking 
distance of the Kurdish capital Erbil in August, the Obama administration ordered airstrikes 
and mounted a rescue operation. Following the operation, Maliki stepped down and was 
replaced by Haider al-Abadi, the deputy leader of the Shi’a Da’wa party.101 
The Iraqi crisis put the United States and Iran on the same side, with President Obama 
admitting publicly in June that he thought Iran could ‘play a constructive role’ in Iraq.102 
Iran’s leadership, however, rejected American overtures about cooperating against the 
Islamic State.103 
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The nuclear negotiators in Vienna nonetheless tried to firewall the Iraqi crisis from the 
ongoing talks, which increasingly focused on how to resolve four outstanding issues. For 
the P5+1, the core issues were the number of centrifuges Iran would be allowed to maintain 
and addressing concerns about Iran’s past research on nuclear weapons. For the Iranians, 
the main points of contention were over when sanctions would be lifted and how long a 
final agreement would remain in place, the so-called ‘sunset’ clause. 
As the deadline for the talks loomed, top US and Iranian officials met in Oman for three 
days in early November to hash out the final details of an agreement. Unfortunately, the 
talks failed to produce a breakthrough on these core issues, though Iran reportedly signed 
an agreement with Russia on 11 November to purchase two more Russian-made nuclear 
power reactors. Russia would apparently provide the fuel for these two reactors, suggesting 
that this could become a component of a larger deal, as the Russian concession was clearly 
designed to sweeten it.104 
For the last half of November, Iranian and P5+1 negotiators met in Vienna for continued 
negotiations. While all sides conceded that significant progress had been made during 
the Geneva talks, the distance between the two sides on the core issues was enough for 
all sides to settle on a seven-month extension. 
Part of the problem, according to British and French officials, was that ‘Iran had not 
demonstrated sufficient flexibility’.105 The Iranians, however, believed that ‘substantial 
progress’ had been made and that this could be built upon to finalise an agreement within 
a matter of weeks or even days.106 
When speaking to reporters after the extension was announced, Kerry related that a 
number of ‘new ideas [had] surfaced’ about how to overcome these obstacles in the days 
prior to the announcement, adding that the US would ‘be fools to walk away’ from the 
talks at this point because an extension meant that Iran would continue to curb its nuclear 
programme while the talks continued. According to the New York Times, ‘in agreeing to 
extend the existing interim agreement, Iran assured itself of a continuation of the sanctions 
relief that had brought it $700 million a month in money that had been frozen abroad’.107
In early December, a US official leaked details of the concessions that Iran had made during 
the talks. According to news reports, Iran agreed to limit further its development of new 
technology for enriching uranium, which seemed to dispel a key critique of the JPOA. 
Critics had charged that Iran could bypass many of the restrictions by developing more 
advanced centrifuges that could enrich more uranium, while still abiding by the letter of 
the agreement. Iran also agreed to convert 35 kilograms of higher-enriched uranium into 
fuel rods, which would render it virtually useless should Iran seek to develop a nuclear 
bomb. Finally, Iran agreed to expanded access for international inspectors to its centrifuge 
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production facilities, a doubling of the number of IAEA inspections, and unannounced or 
‘snap’ inspections.108 Clearly, the Iranians were willing to make significant concessions in 
exchange for limited sanctions relief. 
In mid-December, American and Iranian officials met again in Geneva for a series of bilateral 
talks aimed at resolving the remaining differences that had prevented an agreement from 
being reached in November. While details of the talks are unavailable, the IAEA revealed on 
19 December that Iran had so far kept to the word of the agreement and that no further 
enrichment had taken place beyond the agreed upon limit of 5 percent.109 This significant 
development prompted President Obama to say in an interview on 21 December that the 
last year and a half has been the first time in over a decade that Iran has not advanced its 
nuclear programme, adding, ‘even critics of our policy like the Netanyahu government … 
have acknowledged that … Iran has not made progress’.110
In mid-January, the foreign ministers of the P5+1 and Iran met again in Geneva to discuss 
ways to prevail over the obstacles presented in November. According to news reports, both 
sides had reached the point where a framework was being discussed. Famously, Kerry and 
Zarif were observed taking a long stroll together along Lake Geneva, suggesting that the two 
had developed a good rapport despite the challenges they faced in securing an agreement.111 
On 18 January, it was reported that while both sides had been drafting a framework, the 
talks ‘did not make as much progress’ as had been hoped for.112
cRisis iN Us-isRAEL RELATiONs
As negotiations continued throughout early 2015, staunch opposition emerged from two 
quarters: Congress and Israel. In both cases, relations with the White House deteriorated to 
a new low. Obama sparred with Congress over the question of new sanctions against Iran, 
which he argued would sabotage the talks. Netanyahu conspired with House Republicans 
to address a joint session of Congress in an effort to prevent the nuclear agreement from 
moving forward. 
It was clear by mid-January that a fissure had opened between the White House and Congress 
over the question of imposing further sanctions on Iran for failing to reach a nuclear deal. 
After a meeting with the British Prime Minister David Cameron, President Obama told the 
press that it would be foolish for Congress to impose new sanctions at this point in time, 
asking: ‘Why is it that we would have to take actions that might jeopardize the possibility 
of getting a deal over the next 60 to 90 days? What is it precisely that is going to be 
accomplished?’ He then threatened to veto any legislation that might endanger the talks.113
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A few days later, Obama reiterated this threat before Congress in his State of Union 
address, in which he made it clear that he was pleased with the progress made thus far:
Our diplomacy is at work with respect to Iran, where, for the first time in 
a decade, we’ve halted the progress of its nuclear program and reduced 
its stockpile of nuclear material. Between now and this spring, we have a 
chance to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that prevents a nuclear-
armed Iran, secures America and our allies—including Israel, while avoiding 
yet another Middle East conflict. There are no guarantees that negotiations 
will succeed, and I keep all options on the table to prevent a nuclear Iran. 
On the question of new sanctions, he was unequivocal in his opposition:
But new sanctions passed by this Congress, at this moment in time, will 
all but guarantee that diplomacy fails—alienating America from its allies; 
making it harder to maintain sanctions; and ensuring that Iran starts up 
its nuclear program again. It doesn’t make sense. And that’s why I will 
veto any new sanctions bill that threatens to undo this progress.114
This left little room for interpretation. The White House was now firmly opposed to any 
effort made by Congress that would block the advancement of the ongoing negotiations. 
The period following President Obama’s State of the Union marked a low point in the state 
of US-Israeli relations as well. The relationship between the two allies had already reached 
a state of crisis by October 2014, when Jeffrey Goldberg had reported that a senior White 
House official called Netanyahu ‘chickenshit,’ implying that despite all of his tough talk he 
was too scared to attack Iran. As Goldberg writes, ‘This comment is representative of the 
gloves-off manner in which American and Israeli officials now talk about each other behind 
closed doors, and is yet another sign that relations between the Obama and Netanyahu 
governments have moved toward a full-blown crisis’.115
The state of the relationship only got worse in the weeks following the State of Union. 
The next day, reports emerged that the Speaker of the House, John Boehner, had invited 
Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress without consulting the White House or 
the State Department first.116 This grievous breach in diplomatic and domestic protocol 
pushed the relationship between the US and Israel into uncharted territory, while at the 
same time setting up a showdown between the White House and Congress. 
The question of Netanyahu’s speech to Congress was deeply divisive, especially because 
an election had been called in Israel for 17 March. The reaction to the announcement of 
Netanyahu’s impending speech was largely negative, with Netanyahu’s former ambassador 
to the US Michael Oren criticising the announcement as ‘a cynical political move’ that ‘could 
hurt our attempts to act against Iran.’ He then called on Netanyahu to cancel the talk.117 
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Even the staunchly pro-Israel Anti-Defamation League came out against the invitation, with 
Abe Foxman, its hard-line former president, calling for the speech to be cancelled. Meanwhile, 
a growing number of Democrats, including Vice President Joe Biden, had indicated that 
they would boycott the speech.118 
 Despite the unprecedented level of protest, when Netanyahu arrived in Washington in early 
March to give his speech he received a warm welcome from his allies at the American-Israeli 
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and from Republican members of Congress. However, the 
White House and State Department refused to meet with him and dozens of members of 
Congress boycotted the speech.119
When Netanyahu spoke to Congress on 3 March, his speech was full of hyperbolic language 
and factual errors. For example, Netanyahu accused Iran of supporting Shi’a militias that are 
‘rampaging through Iraq’ and responsible for ‘killing and maiming thousands of American 
servicemen and women in Iraq and Afghanistan’. He argued that Iran was in a competition 
with the Islamic State to establish an ‘Islamic empire … on the region and then on the entire 
world’. Finally, he said that a nuclear deal with Iran would ‘automatically expire in about a 
decade,’ and that under the agreement Iran would be allowed to have ‘190,000 centrifuges 
enriching uranium,’ which give it the capacity to produce a nuclear bomb in a matter of 
weeks.120 Virtually none of these statements were supported by facts.121 The Guardian 
described it as, ‘long on terror, short on substance,’122 while the White House dismissed it 
as, ‘all rhetoric, no new ideas, no action’.123 
Not long after Netanyahu’s speech to Congress, relations between the White House 
and Congress deteriorated further after another unprecedented breach of diplomatic 
protocol. On 9 March, Sen. Cotton, a first term Republican senator from Arkansas, and 46 
other Republicans, sent the Iranian government a letter that purported to explain the US 
constitution and implied that any deal reached with the Obama administration that was 
not ratified by Congress would be an ‘executive agreement’ that could be overturned by 
the next administration.124 
Vice President Biden was not alone in his outrage when he said, ‘I cannot recall another 
instance in which senators wrote directly to advise another country—much less a long-
time foreign adversary—that the president does not have the constitutional authority to 
reach a meaningful understanding with them’.125 Within days, a heated debate emerged 
about whether or not the letter was considered an act of treason, with left-leaning activists 
submitting a petition to the White House that demanded the Justice Department charge 
the 47 senators with treason. It gathered more than 320,000 signatures.126 
The Iranian government’s response to the controversial letter was dismissive. In a statement, 
Zarif explained, ‘this letter has no legal value and is mostly a propaganda ploy’. Moreover, he 
felt it was ‘interesting that while negotiations are still in progress and while no agreement 
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has been reached, some political pressure groups are so afraid even of the prospect of 
an agreement that they resort to unconventional methods, unprecedented in diplomatic 
history’. He then added an important point: ‘the world is not the United States, and the 
conduct of inter-state relations is governed by international law, and not by US domestic 
law. The authors may not fully understand that in international law, governments represent 
the entirety of their respective states, are responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs, 
are required to fulfil the obligations they undertake with other states and may not invoke 
their internal law as justification for failure to perform their international obligations’.127 
Later, in an interview, Zarif explained that should an agreement be signed it will then be 
ratified by the United Nations Security Council and become law ‘whether Senator Cotton 
likes it or not’.128
Amidst the domestic turmoil caused by the letter, the lead-up to the Israeli general election 
took a bitter turn when Netanyahu indicated that he would never allow the creation of 
a Palestinian state under his watch, thereby repudiating his previous support for a two-
state solution.129 More problematic, on Election Day, 17 March, he took to Facebook to 
warn that ‘Arab voters are coming out in droves to the polls. Left-wing organizations are 
bussing them out’.130 Netanyahu’s remarks prompted an angry reaction from not only the 
White House, which said it would need to ‘reassess aspects of its relationship with Israel,’131 
but also from editorial boards across the United States and some pro-Jewish groups. For 
example, the New York Times editorial board described his remarks as a ‘racist rant,’ and 
said that he had ‘forfeited any claim to representing all Israelis;’ the LA Times said that his 
words were ‘part of a disturbing, undemocratic conversation that has been underway in 
Israel for a long time;’ and even the conservative Rabbinical Assembly issued a statement 
condemning his remarks, describing them as ‘indefensible,’ ‘unacceptable,’ ‘divisive and 
undemocratic’.132 Despite the controversy, Netanyahu’s remarks cost him very little at 
home and may have helped him clinch another term. After securing an electoral victory, 
Netanyahu backtracked on his remarks and issued an apology.133 The White House was 
furious about the entire ordeal.
As a sign of its displeasure President Obama waited several days to offer his congratulations, 
which is unusual. And when he did speak to the Israeli Prime Minister, he told him, ‘that 
given his statements prior to the election, it is going to be hard to find a path where people 
are seriously believing that negotiations are possible’.134 
In short the confrontation between the White House and Congress over Netanyahu’s 
speech, Congress’s efforts to sabotage the Iran nuclear talks by passing a new round of 
sanctions, Sen. Cotton’s disregard of diplomatic protocol and Netanyahu’s abandonment 
of the peace process and controversial remarks all showed that throughout the first 
quarter of 2015 the White House was engaged in a war of words with not only its own 
government but one of its closest allies.
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THE BREAkTHROUGH iN LAUsANNE
Despite all of its efforts, Congress and the pro-Israel lobby were unable to scuttle the P5+1’s 
talks with Iran, which had resumed in Lausanne, Switzerland in earnest on 15 March. 
For the next two weeks, nuclear negotiators from all sides worked tirelessly, at all hours of 
the day, to finalise details of what would become a comprehensive framework that would lay 
out the basis of a final nuclear accord. Against the backdrop of these marathon negotiations, 
tensions continued to grow between the White House and Congress, which was still pushing 
for further sanctions on Iran. 
One of the biggest complaints coming from Congress was that the White House was not 
consulting with it enough. In an interview with CBS News, Secretary Kerry said this argument 
was nonsense. ‘We have had over 205 briefings, phone calls, discussions with Congress 
[about the nuclear talks]; 119 of them have taken place since January this year. We have 
been in full discussion with Congress about this.’135 Clearly, the suggestion that the White 
House and State Department had not been keeping Congress in the loop is a red herring.
The negotiations continued for the next two weeks. Early reports indicated that ‘significant 
progress’ had been achieved in the talks, but the two sides appeared to have been stuck on 
two main points that would stand out as the main obstacles in the negotiations: 1) the scope 
of the research and development Iran will be allowed in the final stage of the agreement, 
and 2) how fast the UNSC would lift sanctions.136 
After an initial round of high-level talks between Kerry and Zarif on 18 March, which 
included their deputies and political and energy experts from both countries,137 the two 
sides broke off for the Iranian New Year. Then, between 21 and 27 March, American and 
Iranian diplomats met again to hold technical talks aimed at finding common ground on the 
research and development question, which would include the dismantling of key elements 
of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.138 
On 25 March, Assistant Secretary Sherman met with her two main Iranian counterparts, 
Deputy Foreign Ministers Abbas Araghchi (for Legal and International Affairs) and Majid 
Ravanchi (for European and American Affairs), in Lausanne to build upon the progress 
achieved in the technical talks and to find a pathway to a mutually acceptable framework. 
According Rozen’s in-depth report on the negotiations, the American team shuffled back and 
forth between rooms in the hotel with a whiteboard outlining the key points of agreement 
and contention in the talks. This whiteboard method proved to be the key to achieving a 
breakthrough because it allowed Iranian diplomats to avoid creating a paper trail that would 
have to be reported back to Tehran. According to a US official who was in the room, the 
whiteboard allowed both sides to go through ‘all the elements’ of a potential agreement, 
without either side needing to make firm commitments.139 
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The next day, Kerry and Zarif arrived in Lausanne to advance further the progress that had 
been achieved over the past two weeks, the other P5+1 foreign ministers joined the talks on 
28-29 March.140 The talks would continue at an intensive pace for the next six days, often 
running through the night.141 Once again, the main sticking points were how fast sanctions 
would be lifted and the level of research and development that Iran would be allowed. 
On the afternoon of April 2, President Rouhani and Zarif took to Twitter to announce that 
the negotiators had ‘found solutions’ and that the negotiators were ‘ready to start drafting 
[a final agreement] immediately’.142 Soon thereafter, a formal announcement was made 
that the P5+1 and Iran had agree to a document known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (JCPOA).143 
In the 4-page document, Iran agreed to limit its level of enrichment to 3.67 percent and to 
reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium from 10,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms for 
the next 15 years. All enrichment facilities will be placed under IAEA supervision. Iran also 
agreed not to build any new facilities and reduce by two thirds the number of centrifuges 
that it had installed to roughly 5,000, and to convert Fordo into a research centre.144 In 
return for these concessions, the P5+1 agreed to slowly lift sanctions against Iran as it met 
key benchmarks, though the architecture of the sanctions programmes would remain and 
could snap back into place if it were determined that Iran had cheated.145 
The JCPOA established the framework for a final agreement, but a lot of work still had to 
be completed before the new deadline, now set for 30 June. Unsurprisingly, Republican 
lawmakers criticised the JCPOA, with House Speaker John Boehner issuing a statement 
saying: ‘My concerns about Iran’s efforts to ferment unrest, brutal violence and terror have 
only grown. It would be naïve to suggest the Iranian regime will not continue to use its 
nuclear program, and any economic relief, to further destabilize the region.’146 
In the face of such criticism, the White House abruptly shifted its tactics toward Congress 
on 15 April, when it announced that President Obama was willing to sign a compromise bill 
that would give Congress thirty days to review an agreement if it were reached by 7 July or 
60 days if it ran past that date. This gesture, designed to placate the Senate Foreign Affairs 
Committee, which had just voted unanimously to move its draft legislation to the floor,147 
paved the way for the passage of the compromise bill by overwhelming proportions in the 
Senate (98-1) on 7 May148 and the House on 15 May (400-25).149 The president signed it 
into law on 21 May.150 The problem with this concession at home was that it incentivised 
the Iranians to stall the negotiations and insist on last minute demands, knowing that the 
Obama administration faced a deadline.151
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Meanwhile, relations between the United States and Iran continued to improve, as both 
countries built on the personal relationships that had been established during the arduous 
Lausanne talks. On 27 April, Secretary Kerry visited the Iranian delegation to the United 
Nations’ residence in New York City—the first time a high level US official had visited Iranian 
property since the revolution.152 
Reports also emerged in early May that Iran and the United States have both agreed for the 
renovation of the Swiss-run US Interests Section in Tehran and allowing the Iranian Interests 
Section in Washington, which has traditionally been housed in the Indian embassy, to 
move to a new headquarters. This signalled what may be a step toward the establishment 
of an increased diplomatic presence for both countries, including the eventual, reciprocal 
establishment of embassies.153 
The Saudi Arabian government has been a vocal opponent throughout the talks. In early May, 
Saudi escalated tensions further when it announced that it would match any nuclear capability 
that the Iranians have achieved. For years the Saudi government has been accusing Iran of 
supporting the Houthi rebels,154 who have recently been successful in seizing large swathes 
of Yemeni territory, leading to a Saudi-led bombing campaign to halt their advance.155 The 
Saudi threat to match Iran’s nuclear capability only increased the possibility of an escalating 
nuclear enrichment race in the region. This did not, however, deter the nuclear negotiators 
from pressing ahead with the talks. 
Also in May another troubling bilateral US-Iran issue cropped up, when the closed-door trial 
of a Washington Post reporter, Jason Rezaian, who had been in jail on espionage charges in 
Iran since July 2014 began.156 This issue had been rather vexing for the nuclear negotiators, 
because the trial was being conducted by Iran’s hardline judiciary, which neither President 
Rouhani nor Foreign Minister Zarif had any influence over. Worse, the trial was held in 
secret and Rezaian was only aloud to meet with his lawyer for one hour. On 12 October 
2015, it was reported that Rezaian had been convicted, but still no details of the verdict or 
the sentence handed down were made public. The uncertainty of Rezaian’s fate, and those 
of other Americans held in Iran, will continue to be an ongoing challenge to any further 
improvement in American-Iranian relations, though there is a possibility that Iran might seek 
to trade Rezaian and the other Americans in exchange for Iranians held in the United States 
for violating sanctions.157 
Between late-May and mid-July, the P5+1 and Iran worked on the specific terms of the 
JCPOA. On 30 May, Kerry and Zarif met in Geneva for a six-hour long meeting aimed at 
overcoming some of the key obstacles to achieving an agreement.158 From the outset of this 
new round, concerns were raised about the viability of the 30 June deadline, which seemed 
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arbitrary and appeared to constrain the P5+1 negotiating position.159 Moreover amid the 
talks, the IAEA reported that Iran’s stockpile of nuclear fuel had increased over the past 
18 months, which seemed to undercut the Obama administration’s argument that Iran’s 
nuclear programme had been ‘frozen’ throughout the talks.160 
Meanwhile, Israeli officials and members of Congress continued to rail against the ongoing 
talks, with Netanyahu calling on the negotiators to ‘reject this bad agreement and insist 
on a better [one],’161 while Sen. Corker said that he was ‘alarmed’ by the concessions that 
American negotiating team was making in Vienna, adding, ‘it is breath-taking to see how 
far from your original goals and statements the P5+1 have come during negotiations with 
Iran.’162 Part of the reason for Netanyahu and Corker’s alarm were reports that suggested 
that Secretary Kerry had indicated that the US was prepared to ease sanctions against 
Iran despite not resolving the question of whether it had been clandestinely working on a 
nuclear weapon. This question had been separated from the main foci of the negotiations 
but had increasingly become an obstacle to achieving a compromise.163 
The question of when and in what form Iran would receive sanctions relief continued to 
confound negotiators in Vienna. To make matters worse, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a 
public demand for sanctions to be lifted before he would endorse any nuclear deal and 
refused to allow inspectors into military sites.164 By the same token, after an additional 
extension of the talks at the end of June due to the increased likelihood of deal,165 the 
Iranians raised the question of lifting an embargo against arms sales and purchases on 6 
July. As one European negotiator noted, ‘I think the Iranians see an opportunity here to 
break the solidarity of their negotiating opponents.’166 
These moves resembled traditional bazaari negotiating tactics, where just before a deal is 
ready to be clinched new demands are made in the hope of obtaining further concessions 
or a better deal. But the Iranian move set off a heated response from the P5+1 negotiators, 
leading to an intense, private exchange between Zarif and Kerry during which an aide 
entered the room to inform them that ‘everyone outside could hear their [argument]’. Zarif 
had reportedly declared on 8 July, ‘Never try to threaten the Iranians,’ which prompted 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to add disarmingly: ‘Nor the Russians’.167 
Despite this tense situation and a further extension of the talks, it became increasingly 
clear over the weekend of 11-12 July that a final nuclear deal had been clinched at last. 
On 14 July, it was announced that the P5+1 and Iran had reached an agreement on a final 
nuclear deal. Despite all of the obstacles at home and abroad that the negotiators faced, 
they had finally managed to reach a compromise that would prevent Iran from obtaining a 
nuclear weapon, while at the same time recognizing its ‘inalienable right’ to enrich uranium. 
Meanwhile, Washington braced for one of the greatest political battles of modern history. 
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THE NUcLEAR DEAL
The terms of the nuclear deal are important. According to the White House, the agreement 
put in place measures to curb four main pathways Iran could take to produce a nuclear 
weapon: highly enriched uranium plants at Natanz and Fordow, the production of weapons 
grade plutonium at Arak and the development of a covert nuclear programme. Under the 
deal, Iran’s theoretical breakout time for producing a nuclear weapon was pushed back from 
2-3 months to a minimum of one year, which would have to be maintained for the next 
decade. Iran would not be allowed to enrich uranium above 3.67 percent and its stockpile 
of low-enriched uranium would be capped at 300 kilograms for fifteen years. Limits would 
also be placed on research and development on advanced centrifuges and be confined to 
the Natantz facility. No enrichment would be allowed at the Fordow facility, which would 
be converted into a research centre. Iran also agreed that it would not build any new heavy 
water reactors for the next fifteen years. Finally, Iran agreed to re-design its Arak research 
reactor so that it would not generate weapons-useable plutonium and to ship any spent fuel 
outside of the country in perpetuity. This cuts Iran off from a supply of plutonium forever.168 
To ensure that Iran complies with these terms, it has agreed to sign the Additional Protocol 
to the NPT, which would allow IAEA inspectors to access all of its facilities and the use of 
modern monitoring technology. In addition, for the next 20 years, the IAEA will monitor the 
production of centrifuges, their assembly and their storage. Further, the IAEA will have access 
to all uranium mines and mills to ensure that nothing is being diverted for the next 25 years, 
and monitor the production, supply, and the storage of Iran’s centrifuges in perpetuity. The 
IAEA will also have 24-hour access to all Iran’s declared nuclear sites.169 
In exchange for these concessions, Iran will receive a ‘comprehensive lifting’ of the economic 
sanctions that have crippled its economy. These economic carrots include gaining access to 
international banking systems, which have made it difficult for Iranians to trade internationally, 
or for expatriates to send remittances to their families. These measures would be enshrined 
in a new Security Council resolution, which will terminate all previous resolutions aimed at 
Iran’s nuclear programme. This does not, however, mean that Iran gets immediate relief, 
rather the lifting of sanctions is conditioned on a series of steps that it will need make first. 
At the same time, the JCPOA puts in place provisions for the sanctions to ‘snap back’ into 
place if it was determined that Iran had cheated and the arms embargo against Iran would 
remain in place for the next eight years.170
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THE cONGREssiONAL REviEW
In accordance with the Corker-Cardin resolution the Obama administration was required to 
submit the agreement to Congress for a 60-day review period and a resolution in support 
of the agreement to the United Nations. Upon doing so, the White House set off one 
of the most divisive debates between Congress and the White House in modern history. 
The response to the 14 July announcement was predictably acrimonious. The White House 
hailed the agreement as a ‘historic deal,’ with President Obama saying that while he 
welcomed Congress’s input on the agreement, he would veto any Republican effort aimed 
at scuttling it. Speaking to CNN in Vienna, Kerry said,:‘This is the good deal that we have 
sought.’171 Among Democrats in Congress there were mixed feelings. On the one hand, 
many Democrats felt concerned that the administration had given too much away, but 
were willing to listen to the administration’s pitch before making up their minds.172 Others, 
like Sen. Menendez, felt that the administration gave away too much and wanted a better 
deal. ‘The deal doesn’t end Iran’s nuclear program—it preserves it.’173 Menendez’s view, 
however, fits more along the lines of those of Netanyahu, who denounced the agreement 
as an ‘historic mistake,’174 and Speaker Boehner, who told reporters that the terms of the 
deal were ‘unacceptable’.175 Indeed, within hours of the deal’s announcement, pro-Israel 
groups launched a $30 million lobbying campaign aimed at convincing enough congressional 
Democrats to reject the deal and override President Obama’s veto, they would need 61 
senators to reject the deal and 67 to override a presidential veto.176 
On 17 July, the United States introduced the draft resolution to the Security Council, which 
passed in a unanimous vote on 20 July, becoming UNSC resolution 2231. Beyond endorsing 
the Iran deal, the resolution called upon member states to support the implementation 
of the resolution, requested that the IAEA begin verifying and monitoring Iran’s nuclear 
programme under the terms laid out in the JCPOA and report its findings to the Security 
Council, established a framework for lifting sanctions, and put in place a measure that 
would effectively prevent the five permanent members from vetoing the imposition of the 
snap-back sanctions.177 This last provision was key. 
As the New York Times explained: ‘If one of the parties to the nuclear deal, like the United 
States, determines that Iran is not fulfilling its commitments, it can ask for a Security 
Council vote on a resolution to continue the deal’s lifting of all Iran sanctions resolutions. 
When a vote takes place, the U.S. or the four other permanent members could then 
veto the resolution, and the sanctions would automatically “snap back” in 30 days.’178 
In other words, a Security Council veto would automatically bring about the re-imposition of 
the sanctions. 
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Understandably, Republicans were openly hostile toward the UN resolution, with Sen. Corker 
urging the White House to postpone submitting it during the congressional review period. 
Corker accused the White House of pulling a fast one on Congress. ‘It is inappropriate to 
commit the United States to meet certain international obligations without even knowing 
if Congress and the American people approve or disapprove of the Iran agreement’ he 
argued.179 However, the notion that America’s negotiating partners would defer action to 
Congress, as Secretary Kerry observed, is a bit unrealistic. ‘It’s presumptuous of some people 
to suspect that France, Russia, China, Germany, Britain ought to do what the Congress tells 
them to do.’180 Sherman went a bit further, observing in a sarcastic tone, ‘Well, excuse me, 
the world, you should wait for the United States Congress’.181 
The case put forward by opponents of the nuclear accord involved two key refrains. First, 
critics of the deal, including Netanyahu and congressional Republicans, argued that Congress 
should reject the deal and take action to compel the White House, and its negotiating 
partners, to return to the negotiating table and secure a ‘better deal’.182 For example, Mark 
Dubowitz, the executive director for the neoconservative Foundation for the Defense of 
Democracies, argued that ‘Congress can and should require the administration to amend the 
agreement’s fatal flaws, such as the sunset clause and the nuclear snap back’. The problem, 
he recognised, was that America’s European negotiating partners were unlikely to heed an 
American call to renegotiate the agreement. To overcome this, he suggested that the White 
House use the threat of economic sanctions against its negotiating partners to force them 
to return to the table and get a ‘better deal’.183 This suggestion, however, would antagonise 
America’s allies and partners unnecessarily and probably fruitlessly.
The second key argument was that the White House had failed to disclose two secret 
‘side deals’ reached between the IAEA and Iran when it passed the nuclear accord along 
to Congress. Rep. Mike Pomeo (R-Kan.) and Sen. Cotton first learned of the existence of 
these ‘side deals’ in late July, after they met with the deputy director of the IAEA. When 
asked how the nuclear agency would go about verifying that Iran was complying with 
the nuclear accord, the deputy explained that this was between the IAEA and the Iranian 
government. When they asked if they could see these agreements, the congressmen were 
told that this information was classified. They then asked if Secretary Kerry had seen the 
agreement, and were told, in unequivocal terms, ‘No American is ever going to get to see 
them’. Critics of the agreement, like Marc Thiessen, a neoconservative speechwriter for 
the Bush administration, pounced on this, arguing that the White House ‘is gambling our 
national security and handing over $150 billion in sanctions relief to Iran, based on secret 
agreements negotiated between the IAEA and Iran that no U.S. official has seen’.184 
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Throughout August, the debate took on a hyperbolic tone as opponents of the agreement 
resorted to rhetorical attacks against the administration, often accusing the White House 
of abandoning Israel. For example, on 5 August, Sen. Cotton told Israeli reporters, ‘I don’t 
think the Iranian leadership believes that the United States is willing to use force to protect 
our national security objectives’. He added ‘I don’t think any military expert in the United 
States or elsewhere would say the U.S. military is not capable to setting Iran’s nuclear 
facilities back to day zero’.185 The implications of Cotton’s statement irked Sen. Murphy, 
who took to the Senate floor that day to denounce Cotton’s irresponsible choice of words: 
[There] are members of this body who are openly cheerleading for military engagement 
with Iran, who are oversimplifying the effect of military action, who are blind to the reality 
of U.S. military activity in that region over the course of the last 10 to 15 years. This belief 
in the omnipotent, unfailing power of the U.S. military is simply not based in reality. We 
could set back the nuclear program for a series of years, but the consequences to the 
region would be catastrophic.186
That same day, President Obama gave a speech at American University in Washington, DC, 
which outlined his support for the nuclear agreement. Obama described the debate in stark 
terms: ‘Let’s not mince words: The choice we face is ultimately between diplomacy and 
some sort of war—maybe not tomorrow, maybe not three months from now, but soon.’ 
He asked ‘how can we in good conscience justify war before we’ve tested a diplomatic 
agreement that achieves our objectives’ while noting, with some irony, the perception that 
the same hard-liners in Iran, who chant ‘Death to America,’ were ‘making common cause 
with the Republican caucus’.187
As if timed to coincide with President Obama’s speech, that day Sen. Schumer dealt the 
administration a harsh blow when he announced his opposition to the deal. In justifying 
his decision he expressed alarm that inspectors had to give the Iran government 24-days 
notice before the inspection of suspicious sites can take place.188 
The next day, Jeffrey Lewis, a non-proliferation expert, published a stinging rebuttal of 
Schumer’s contention in Foreign Policy. ‘Let’s get this straight. The agreement calls for 
continuous monitoring at all of Iran’s declared sites—that means all of the time.’ Lewis 
argued that Schumer and others were distorting a key part of the agreement dealing 
with possible undeclared sites. ‘Far from giving Iran 24 days,’ Lewis wrote, ‘the IAEA will 
need to give only 24 hours’ notice before showing up at a suspicious site to take samples. 
Access could even be requested with as little as two hours’ notice, something that will 
be much more feasible now that Iran has agreed to let inspectors stay in-country for the 
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long term’. More importantly: 
There is a strict time limit on stalling. Iran must provide access within 
two weeks. If Iran refuses, the Joint Commission set up under the deal 
must decide within seven days whether to force access. Following a 
majority vote in the Joint Commission—where the United States and 
its allies constitute a majority bloc—Iran has three days to comply. 
If it doesn’t, it’s openly violating the deal, which would be grounds 
for the swift return of the international sanctions regime.189 
WAR Of THE LOBByisTs
Throughout the review period, the Obama administration scored a series of political victories 
that all but guaranteed the agreement would overcome congressional opposition. 
First, on 3 August, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced its support for the nuclear 
accord. Speaking on behalf of the six-member council, Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid bin 
Mohammed al-Attiyah said the agreement was ‘the best option among other options, to 
come up with a solution … through dialogue’. In exchange for their endorsement, Kerry 
said the United States would expedite military sales and assistance in order to counter any 
threat Iran might pose. This would include increased intelligence sharing, training special 
forces, maritime interdiction of weapons, improved cooperation on cyber security, and the 
sale of ballistic-missile defence systems.190 
The GCC’s endorsement was important for several reasons. Throughout the negotiations 
the Sunni Gulf States had expressed concern that the accord would allow Shi’a Iran to free 
up resources that could be used to exacerbate regional tensions even further, especially 
in light of Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen. By endorsing the agreement and 
accepting increased American military aid, the GCC also undercut the argument that the 
United States was abandoning its regional allies. Finally, its support meant that Israel was 
now the only nation that was openly opposed to the accord.191 This was a major victory for 
the White House. 
Throughout August and early September, the Obama administration lobbied Senate and House 
Democrats aggressively to secure opposition to any effort to block the deal. According to the 
New York Times, the administration’s effort was vast: ‘Cabinet members and other senior 
administration officials talked directly with more than 200 House members and senators. The 
president spoke personally to about 100 lawmakers, either individually or in small groups, 
and aides said he called 30 lawmakers during his August vacation on Martha’s Vineyard.’ 
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The White House’s primary focus was the Senate, where it needed to secure at least 34 
votes to allow a presidential veto. Its efforts paid off. On 2 September, President Obama 
announced that he had enough votes in the Senate to veto the Republican-led effort to 
block the Iran Deal in Congress.192 Thanks to procedural rules, the Republicans needed at 
least 60 votes for the resolution of disapproval to overcome a filibuster and pass, which 
would prompt a presidential veto. However, if they cannot secure 60 votes, the resolution 
would be dead in the water.193 On 6 September, the White House announced that it had 
secured 42 votes in the Senate: the implementation of the Iran deal was unstoppable.194
On 10-11 September, both the House and Senate debated two pieces of legislation related 
to the Iran deal: 1) a resolution disapproving the Iran deal; 2) a resolution blocking the 
president from easing sanctions on Iran; and 3) a resolution accusing the administration of 
not fulfilling the terms of the Corker-Cardin Act because it had failed to disclosed details 
about the secret ‘side deals’ between Iran and the IAEA. 
In the Senate, the outcome was already fixed. The Democrats filibustered the Republican 
resolution, thereby preventing it from becoming legislation. On 10 September, after a 
long day of passionate speeches, the Senate voted 58-42 to end the debate, stopping the 
disapproval legislation in its tracks.195 
In the House, the Republican majority put forward a resolution approving the Iran deal, 
knowing that it would fail—244 Republicans and 25 Democrats voted against it and 162 
Democrats in favour.196 The House also passed legislation that would prevent President 
Obama from easing sanctions on Iran by a vote along party lines (247-186), with the entire 
Democrat caucus voting against the measure.197 
Having failed to block the deal, the Republicans put forward legislation that asserted that 
the administration had not complied with Corker-Cardin through its failure to disclose 
details about the ‘secret deal’ between the IAEA and Iran. Again, the vote was entirely 
along party lines (245-186), with two abstentions.198 
The failure of the opponents of the Iran nuclear deal to pass any legislation effectively 
rendered the debate closed. After years of challenging negotiations with the Iranians, 
and several months of intense debate, the Obama administration and its allies had finally 
prevailed over their opponents and ensured that the United States would abide by the 
terms of the Iran deal. If Iran abides by the terms of the agreement, which respected 
analysts believe will be the case,199 the Obama administration will have secured the single 
most important victory to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in several decades. 
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LOOkiNG AHEAD
Having secured a nuclear deal, it is worthwhile to consider the implications of a potential 
deal for the United States, Iran and Israel. On balance, the US stands to gain the most from 
a nuclear deal with Iran, but there are positive implications for both Iran and Israel. 
 
United States
Following a series of announcements in late 2011, Washington has indicated its intention to 
‘rebalance’ its foreign policy and make a strategic pivot towards Asia.200 In order to achieve this, 
the Obama administration has made a concerted effort to disengage itself from the Middle 
East’s many problems. This was evident in Secretary Kerry’s intensive and unsuccessful effort 
to bring about a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as President Obama’s 
reluctance to involve America in the Syrian Civil War or the ongoing Iraq crisis. If the US can 
extricate itself from these conflicts, it could then refocus its energies in Asia. According to 
Parsi, the Obama administration has recognised that a functioning relationship with Iran 
could help the United States pivot towards Asia: ‘Many of the problems in the region have 
become all the more difficult to resolve as a result of the US and Iran not being able to talk 
to each other.’201
For the better part of a century, America’s policy towards the Gulf has been aimed at not 
allowing the dominance of a single state, keeping oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz 
on global markets and limiting its military presence in the region, while ensuring the safety 
of its regional allies, particularly Israel.202 To the US, resolving the Iranian nuclear question 
aligns perfectly with these objectives. 
A nuclear deal will significantly reduce the likelihood of an Israeli military strike against Iran, 
bring Iranian oil back into the global oil supply and hopefully stave off a potential nuclear 
arms race between Iran and Saudi Arabia. More importantly, on important regional issues 
such as stabilising the civil wars in Iraq and Syria, reining in terrorism in Pakistan, preventing 
a Taliban victory in Afghanistan and countering the region’s heroin trade, it is possible that 
resolving the nuclear issue could lead to joint cooperation.
Finally, the Iran nuclear deal has alleviated a problem that has vexed the United States for 
over a decade, which should make it easier to undertake a strategic pivot towards East Asia. 
However, the rise of the Islamic State, and the problems that it poses to the Middle East 
regional order, could side-track American policymakers and prevent them from taking the 
steps needed to complete the pivot. 
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Iran 
The international sanctions regime has devastated Iran’s economy and left it as a pariah state, 
so having these measures lifted will likely bring it back into the international community. 
‘All Iranians see Iran as a great power,’ observed Gary Sick. Like many Americans, they see 
their country as an ‘exceptional state,’ the idea that they are indispensable, that ‘everything 
revolves around them’. Unfortunately, if Iran is ever achieve to this, it will have to rid itself 
of the nuclear issue, and only then can things begin to happen.203 
Ali Ansari, a leading Iran expert at the University of St. Andrews, agrees. The driving force 
behind Iran’s diplomacy, he says, ‘is to sort the economy out and … get the sanctions 
lifted’.204 However, Axworthy believes that the main reason for Iran coming to the table 
could be because it had already achieved its nuclear objectives. Moreover, he argues, the 
nuclear deal shows that the Islamic Republic has ‘managed to secure a degree of respect 
as a legitimate sovereign state, in contrast with its previous history of national humiliation 
and repeated foreign interference’.205 In achieving the nuclear deal, Iran is well positioned 
to improve on both of these elements. 
The implications of a nuclear deal are generally positive. One likely outcome of a deal, 
according to Parsi, is that ‘Iran will break out of its isolation and … be increasingly treated 
as a regional player, because discussions between the United States and Iran will have 
been normalised’.206 At the same time, tensions will likely be reduced across the board, 
and not just with the United States, but with the EU and the Gulf States, and could lead 
to increased cooperation against ISIS. 
There are other potential positive outcomes as well: Iran will be allowed to trade 
internationally, Western investment will help restore its oil industry and it could be given 
a greater role in ensuring the security of the Gulf, provided the Saudis acquiesce. All of 
these outcomes not only benefit Iran but will also help stabilise the region and bridge 
the Sunni-Shia divide. In addition, Iran could use its influence with the Syrian regime and 
Hezbollah to help bring a peaceful end to the Syrian Civil War and perhaps pressure Hamas 
into seeking peace with Israel, though this is a long shot. 
Importantly, the lifting of sanctions against Iran could help foster positive relations with 
emerging powers, like Brazil and Turkey, which had been hindered due to American 
pressure. The strengthening of Iran’s relations with these two ostensibly pro-Western 
nations is to America’s advantage and should be encouraged. Similarly, the reopening 
of Britain’s embassy in Tehran, after several years of estrangement, could also foster an 
improvement of diplomatic and economic relations between Iran and the EU, which will 
only further incentivise ensuring the implementation of the JCPOA.
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Despite all this, simply lifting the sanctions will not solve all Iran’s woes. ‘Even though 
sanctions will be lifted,’ said Parsi, ‘the fundamental problem with the Iranian economy is 
mismanagement and corruption and that will not go away’.207 There is also no guarantee 
that a nuclear deal will be reached. Dennis Ross, who served as President Obama’s point man 
on Iran during his first term, but generally adopts a pro-Israel line, raises a good question: 
‘Even if President Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif, his foreign minister, are ready to 
accept such a deal… can they sell this to the Supreme Leader?’208 This seems to be the case, 
as Khamenei has endorsed the deal, which the Iranian Majles voted to approve of on 13 
October by an overwhelming majority, with 161 voting in favour of the deal and 59 voting 
against, while 13 abstained.209 The following day, Iran’s supreme legislative authority, the 
Guardian Council, gave its approval of the deal, effectively ratifying the agreement.210 
Israel 
Despite its contentious approach, the Israeli government’s aggressive stance actually played 
a significant role in bringing about the Iran nuclear deal. If the United States was the good 
cop, then Israel was surely the bad cop. In the end, the implications of a nuclear deal for 
Israel swing both ways. According to Amnon Aran, an Israeli specialist at City University 
London, the Israelis fear that a nuclear deal is simply a delaying mechanism for the Iranians 
to gather strength and keep their basic foreign policy orientation intact and then emerge 
even more powerful with a nuclear threshold capability.211 Ross takes these concerns a step 
further: ‘the worry is that we will conclude a deal that leaves the Iranians as a threshold 
nuclear state: capable of breaking out to nuclear weapons at a time when we might be 
distracted by another international crisis.’ With an intact nuclear programme, the Israelis 
will continue to view Iran as an ‘existential threat’.212 
Parsi disagrees with this view. He believes that Israel could actually be the big winner of the 
nuclear deal. ‘If [Israel] truly believes that Iran’s nuclear capability is a problem, [a] deal [that] 
makes sure Iran cannot build a weapon without getting caught, is a significant enhancement 
of Israel’s security.’ However, for Israel to capitalise on the benefits of a nuclear deal, Parsi 
believes, ‘[there] will need to be some form of a shakeup in Israel because the Netanyahu 
government has taken Israel down a path and painted Israel into a corner at a time when 
Israel needs to be flexible and agile strategically, and it currently isn’t’.213 Any reduction of 
the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon corresponds to an improvement in Israel’s security. 
At the same time, a functioning American-Iranian relationship will create a scenario where 
it is more difficult for Iran to pursue the same hostile policies toward Israel that it has in the 
past without repercussions. 214 
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In the end, it is clear that the US and Iran both stand to gain considerably from a nuclear 
deal, but the Israeli government and its allies in Congress stand out as potential spoilers. The 
problem, according to Sick, is that Israel and Iran are locked in a Cold War-like geostrategic 
rivalry, with America caught in the middle. ‘Israel has quite deliberately chosen Iran as their 
enemy,’ says Sick, which makes it difficult for the US to open up to Iran without hurting its 
already tense relationship with Netanyahu.215 As Israel continues to undermine American 
efforts to secure a nuclear deal with Iran or broker a peace agreement between the Israelis 
and Palestinians, it is no wonder that there is a crisis in US-Israel relations.216 
cONcLUsiON
There were five factors that contributed to the successful conclusion of the Iran nuclear deal. 
The first was the role that American and Israeli covert action played in sabotaging Iran’s 
nuclear programme or threatening those who participated. While these efforts did not 
result in any significant reduction in Iran’s ability to enrich uranium, these actions showed 
the Iranians the lengths to which the United States was willing to go in order to prevent 
it from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 
The second factor was the real threat of either an Israeli, or American, airstrike on Iran’s 
nuclear infrastructure. Although it was evident that President Obama was opposed to this 
option, his regular reiterations that ‘all options were on the table’ nonetheless played a 
role in bringing Iran to the table. 
The third—and perhaps the most significant—factor was the escalating series of sanctions 
placed against the Iranian regime. In particular, the Obama administration deserves credit 
for the way in which he wrangled all of the permanent members of the Security Council 
into adoption of a harsh sanctions regiment, in addition to his success at persuading the 
European Union, Japan and South Korea to no longer purchase Iranian oil. The sanctions 
sent the Iranian economy into a tailspin, with inflation reaching unprecedented levels. This, 
in turn, put pressure on the Iranian government to find ways to alleviate the economic 
crisis. The most logical solution was to negotiate. 
The fourth factor that contributed to the Iran deal was the coming to office of willing 
negotiating partners in both Tehran and Washington. Prior to the election of President Obama 
in 2008, American presidents had only shown a fleeting interest in improving relations with 
Iran. To Obama, Iran’s nuclear programme was a major foreign policy challenge, but not 
one that he felt could be resolved exclusively by force. Even after the controversial 2009 
election in Iran, the Obama White House consistently showed its interest in engaging the 
Iranians in private, away from the spotlight. This led to the tentative rounds of bilateral 
American-Iranian talks in Oman, but it was not until Hassan Rouhani was elected in 2013 
that these negotiations began in earnest. 
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The fifth and final factor was the skilful diplomacy and personalities of the nuclear negotiators, 
Secretary Kerry and Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. The Iran deal might 
not have been secured had it not been for the tireless efforts of these two statesmen. In 
their weeks-long negotiations, they mastered the art of compromise and achieved what 
many people did not believe was possible: an agreement that set out a clear framework for 
blocking the four pathways to a nuclear bomb, while allowing Iran to save face through the 
recognition of its right to enrich uranium in addition to the lifting of sanctions. No negotiated 
deal is ever without its flaws, but the one reached in Lausanne provided a pathway for 
Iran to return to the international community, while preventing it from achieving a nuclear 
bomb. Nevertheless, as a testament to their success, both Kerry and Zarif were among the 
contenders for the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize.217 
In the end, no single factor contributed to the securing of the Iran nuclear deal, rather it 
took a combination of these factors to produce the agreement. American and Israeli covert 
action and the threat of a military strike against Iran showed that both were serious about 
preventing it from obtaining a nuclear weapon; the sanctions gave the United States and 
its negotiating partners the leverage they needed to induce Iran into genuinely negotiating 
a way to alleviate the economic crisis they had induced; and finally, the coming to power 
of a group of individuals—inside both Iran and the United States—and their desire to reach 
final settlement all brought about the securing what could be one of the greatest diplomatic 
breakthroughs in decades. ■
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After nearly 20 months of near continuous 
negotiations, in 2015 Iran and the P5+1 reached a 
deal designed to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear 
weapons capability in exchange for relief from the 
sanctions that have been crippling its economy over 
the course of the past decade.
How was this momentous agreement reached? 
This Strategic Update traces the story of this major 
diplomatic breakthrough, through the historical 
context of long term US-Iran relations and the tireless 
international effort to prevent domestic political crises 
from derailing the negotiations. 
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